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            I. 
Company law is traditionally understood in Europe as the law of  associations, and 
this is how it is taught in our law schools. Companies, including those listed on stock 
exchanges,  are  associations of members.  In some cases t he relationship of  the 
individual members to the undertaking can be close; for example, the members may 
manage the company.  In other cases, the members might restrict themselves to the 
role of providers of equity capital.  However, even in the latter case – which is typical 
of the relationship of small investors and institutional investors to a listed company – 
the shareholders are comparable to members of an association. Each member has the 
right to vote and influence the direction of the company, the management bodies have 
fiduciary duties towards the members, etc.  This model, which  considers even  the 
shareholders of listed companies to be members of an association, has increasingly 
been  called into question.   This paradigm shift, which has also  influenced the 
thinking of  legal  scholars in Continental Europe,  was triggered by findings in 
financial economics, which considers shareholders to be parties to a particular type of 
financial contract  with a particular set of rights.  This theory sees a company as a 
nexus of  contracts  between individual investors and the company’s management.  
The ideal point of reference for the shareholder is no longer that of a member of an 
association.  Rather, as a mere provider of capital, the shareholder is the last link in a 
chain of relationships that runs from the providers of credit to the providers of equity 
capital.    There are a  number of hybrid forms  –  developed  by modern financial 
practice – which lie between these two poles. 
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What does this paradigm shift mean for legal theory and academic doctrine? 
The rights and duties of shareholders must be reconstructed, must be understood 
and defined anew in the light of their function as financers of the undertaking.  The 
shareholder’s voting right does not serve to express  the position of an individual 
member of an association. Shareholders only have voting rights because they have a 
residual claim rather than a fixed right to receive interest, as in the case of creditors.  
A creditor’s rights to information and to influence the management serve to protect 
his claim to interest and payment of the principal.  They are a result of the contractual 
provisions or the terms and conditions of loans negotiated between the parties, and 
are ancillary to the legal instruments through which such rights are enforced.  Here, 
the claim for payment is primary.  In contrast, the provider of equity capital receives 
from  the outset open-ended rights to the  ‘residual’  based  on his investment.  The 
rights to receive information and influence the direction of the company – including 
the right to sue the company directly or derivatively – are components of the complex 
mechanism  which is summarised  by  the concept of  ‘corporate  governance’.   This 
mechanism is designed to ensure that the value of the undertaking and its 
distributable profits – i.e. its ‘residual’ – increase.  Since shareholders have a right to 
the residual, they also generally have sufficient incentive to make use of their powers 
of influence to increase the value of the company.    To sum up, both  types of 
providers of capital have control and enforcement rights, each fitting the  nature of 
their particular claims.  
Other key concepts of our company law, such as fiduciary duties, must also be 
oriented towards this new perspective. Does management only have a fiduciary duty 
towards the  providers  of equity capital? W hy don’t they have  a comparable duty 
towards providers of  long-term loans or bond capital?  And does the majority in a 
bondholders meeting also have a fiduciary duty towards the  minority?  If  the 
recognised fiduciary duty  which  shareholders owe each other rests on the same 
principle, can minority shareholders really have a fiduciary duty? In other words, is 
there really a principal-agent relationship?   O r should the assumption of such a 
fiduciary duty rather be understood as a way of addressing ‘hold-up’ problems, and   3
does this also apply to minority bondholders? 
If, from this perspective,  we  turn to the  legal concept of the corporation,  in 
particular the  law  governing  publicly listed companies, we no longer see an 
association of members composed of shareholders who have concomitant powers to 
govern the association.  In this traditional model, providers of bond or loan capital are 
only taken into consideration in the context of all the association’s creditors – who 
are protected by mandatory rules of law.  In the new model, the company and its 
management bodies stand in relation to various groups of investors holding securities 
with differing characteristics, ranging from equity to bond and loan capital, and the 
rights and duties of  these  investors  are  best  explained  as a function of the 
characteristics of the instruments they hold.  Classical company law is understood 
purely as a law of organised associations of providers of equity, with specific rules 
protecting creditors. In contrast, the law of corporate finance addresses all equity and 
debt instruments,  their c haracteristics,  their rights and duties,  and their similarities 
and differences – including the possibility of exchanging one instrument for another 
or converting one instrument into another.   From this point of view, surprising 
parallels become apparent.    For example, identical collective action problems  exist 
when bondholders as well as shareholders must approve a restructuring. Among other 
things, this requires a resolution to be approved by the majority of the shareholders, 
and  a similar resolution  to b e approved  by the bondholders.    On  the question of 
majority resolutions, we find ourselves  right in the centre of a  ‘company law of 
bondholders’; here too there will be minority/majority conflicts, questions of voting 
rights, and judicial review of challenged resolutions, among other problems. 
At this point, I would like to turn from these brief observations on shifts in our 
fundamental understanding of companies and their constituents to some of the newer 
developments in the law of corporate finance at the EU level. 
 
            II. 
As is well known, the Second Company Law Directive cemented traditional capital   4
protection rules – a system in which both the establishment of minimum capital and 
rules for its maintenance are mandatory – in European law.  This is not the right place 
to go into the pros and cons of this system.  We all know, however, that this system 
hinders or even blocks a number of desirable capital market transactions.  The legally 
required minimum capital  bears  no relationship whatsoever to  the  adequate 
capitalisation of  a  company.  When making a distribution to shareholders, it is not 
asked whether,  despite the distribution,  the company  will still be able to pay its 
current debts as they fall due; the question is whether the capital figure fixed at some 
point  in the past and the required reserves are maintained.  Under these rules it is 
difficult to issue and repurchase securities to take advantage of favourable market 
conditions.  Among other things, the provision of  ‘financial assistance’ by the 
company to shareholders is strictly limited.  
In Directive  2006/68/EC, amending the Second Company Law Directive,  the 
EU took a careful step towards deregulating the rigid requirements of the Second 
Directive.  In future, under certain circumstances it will be possible to do without an 
expert  valuation  of contributions  in  kind, and  the  restrictions on  the repurchase of 
shares and financial assistance to shareholders are to be relaxed. 
In p arallel  with  issuing this Directive, the European Commission requested a 
feasibility study to be prepared.  This study should facilitate a decision on whether, in 
addition to the current system of capital protection, Member States can offer a system 
of capital protection based on the US model.  The basic characteristics of such an 
alternative system could be: 
•  Solvency tests and over-indebtedness tests before making distributions; 
and 
•  The introduction of stricter duties and liability for board members in 
connection with distributions. 
Another policy choice for the Commission would be to completely revoke the 
capital  requirements of the Second Directive,  and  leave the protection of creditors 
essentially to the Member States.   Should the EU really concern itself with   5
introducing pan-European, harmonised rules to establish equal protection for various 
kinds of  company  creditors,  such as  bondholders and banks,  employees,  trade 
suppliers, and tort victims?  Are all these cross-border issues? Do the requirements of 
the Second Directive really protect creditors in a way that significantly exceeds the 
terms and conditions that creditors demand in contracts and bonds, and the 
accompanying protective legislation of individual Member States?    Does 
standardisation offer any advantages in this area, as it does, for example, in the area 
of financial disclosure to investors?  
It seems to me that we must really dedicate much more serious attention to the 
pros and cons of harmonising national company laws than has been seen to date. 
 
  
            III. 
This brings us to my final point – the research agenda.  This agenda flows naturally 
from the observations I have already made. 
First, with regard to the regulation of company law at EU level – we have to 
engage in much more detailed analysis than we have in the past of the pros and cons 
of harmonisation a nd standardisation,  compared with  simply  allowing competition 
between legal systems.   What are the advantages of competition  between  legal 
systems, i.e. competition between the Member States to provide the most attractive 
set of rules?  What advantages do we lose when we eliminate competition through 
harmonisation?  In this debate, we should look at the US experience and the scholarly 
discussion surrounding it.  Instead of issuing directives or regulations, we may want 
to consider developing non-binding  model  acts  like the  (now  ‘Revised’) Model 
Business Corporation Act,  which the individual Member States  should be  free to 
implement (with or without changes), but need not do so. 
Second, and solely regarding Germany, which is the only country I feel qualified 
to comment on,  the  findings  of financial economics should be integrated into our 
scholarly work much more than  it  has been.  The matters on which we  company   6
lawyers focus our attention are divided by economists roughly into  the areas of 
corporate governance and corporate finance, naturally with a significant overlap.  The 
analytical tools that we employ under the rubric of ‘corporate governance’, such as 
the  principal-agent model,  were developed to analyse the financial relationships 
between equity investors and management in order to structure them more efficiently.  
Likewise, the financial structure of a  firm  and the characteristics of financial 
instruments are significant for corporate governance. 
I find most interesting  – particularly for the law  governing publicly listed 
companies – the paradigm shift implied by the uniform treatment, in modern financial 
economics, of all contributors of capital as contractual counterparties of the company.  
This point has already been made at the beginning of this essay.  For shareholders, 
this means reconstructing their rights and duties; for the traditional understanding of 
company law as a law of associations of equity investors, this means an expansion 
into the law on financing individual  firms and corporate groups. The similarities of 
the different groups of investors providing capital must be identified, and a company 
law for bondholders should be developed.  It should be made possible to convert debt 
into equity instruments, and  vice versa.  Issuers and investors should be given the 
broadest  possible  freedom to structure the characteristics of their instruments, as 
necessary.  If this were to be done, company law would not look the same, and the 
teaching of company law would legitimately include corporate finance together with 
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